Humans that some mental event is causing a

Humans have both physical and mental properties. As a result, there exists a mind-body problem involving the discordance of consciousness and thought in relation to the seemingly different body in the physical world (Robinson).  For example, the order of the actions of our physical body in relation to our mental thought processes of that certain action. Because of this, questions concerning mental object, mental state, material object, physical state and their influences on each other arise. Additional problems are the problem of consciousness and the problem of self. 
There are two major views that attempt to explain this philosophical problem, dualism and materialism. In short, dualism engages the idea that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other, while materialism engages the idea that mental states are simply physical states (Robinson). Specifically, dualistic interactionism explains the relationship between the mind and the body, that some mental event is causing a brain event (Robinson). For example, the thought processes of an individual influences the physical response of their brain in the physical world. 
To clarify, the mind or mental object, is an immaterial being which engages in rational thought, imagining, feeling, and willing (Robinson). The matter, or material object conforms mechanically to the laws of physics, with the exception of the human body (Robinson). Specifically, the matter of the human body is causally affected by the human mind which produces certain mental events to occur (Robinson). The idea of dualism is a consensus that explains the unification of the human mind and the human body.  Specifically a form of dualism, interactionism, explains that the mind’s mental events and body’s physical events causally influence each other (Robinson). 
Dualistic interactionism theory presents four main ideas. First, there exists material things as well as mental things (Cornman, 143). Second, mental things are completely different kinds of things from material things (Cornman, 143). Third, mental things are completely nonmaterial which means that mental objects such as minds, in this theory, would be something like pure spirits (Cornman, 143). This is what makes the theory dualistic. Fourth, mental and material things cause interaction, they causally affect one another (Cornman, 143). One common interpretation that dualistic interactionism holds is that a person is not wholly a mental thing nor wholly a material thing (Corman, 144). Instead, a person is a composite being consisting of a mental object joined with a material body. 
        Dualism is defined as any theory that mind and body are distinct kinds of substances and nature (Robinson). Interactionism can be described as the mental events that cause physical brain events (Robinson). To further clarify, a material object is an object that has size, shape, mass, spatial and temporal position and can exist independently of any conscious being (Cornman, 141). A mental object is an object that is either a conscious being, aware of things, or a being that cannot exist independently of some conscious being (Cornman, 141). A material event is something that occurs over a period of time and consists only of material objects (Cornman, 141). For example, the movement of an arm through space. A mental event is something that occurs over a period of time and consists only of mental objects (Cornman, 141). For example, a dream is a mental event. The material state describes a condition or situation of some material object like an infection (Cornman, 141). The mental state is a condition or situation of some mental object(Cornman, 141). For example, psychosis.
Despite the evidence for dualistic interactionism, one might object that there is no evidence as to where the interaction between the mind and body occurs (Cornman, 149). For a dualist interactionist, mental events are said to causally interact with brain events. Because of this, the interaction must take place in the brain stem. The objection continues with the implication that the mental events themselves are located in the brain since it is assumed that two causally related events are each located where the causal interaction occurs (Cornman, 149). This is considered to be problematic because according to the premise of dualistic interactionism, mental events do not have material features except that of time (Cornman, 149). 
This objection suggests a contradiction between the idea that interaction requires mental events to occur in the brain and dualistic interactionism denies that mental events occur anywhere. However, this objection is not accurate because it fails to consider whether causally related events must be located in the same place (Cornman, 149). For example, consider the occurrence of action at a distance, such as the gravitational pull of the moon on the ocean tides (Corman, 149). The gravitational pull of the moon is not located at the movement of the ocean tides but rather is affecting the movement from afar (Corman, 149). Because of this, it is logically possible that causal interaction occurs between non-spatially mental events and spatially located material events (Cornman, 149). 
A second objection presents the question of how the interaction between the mental and material occurs (Cornman, 149). This objection comes from the basis that typically material phenomena are causally affected by something exerting a physical force upon an object. The objection counters the idea that according to a dualist, nothing mental has mass therefore it cannot exert a physical force. Thus, “nothing material, such as the body, can be causally affected by anything mental” (Cornman, 150). This objection is based on both the absence of similar features and the absence of features relevant to the known interaction principles. 
This objection suggests that the difference in the cause between the mental and the material do not share any features that would create causal interaction. However, C. J. Ducasse claims that “causality relation does not presuppose at all that it’s causes and effects belong to the same category” (Cornman, 150). Rather, both the cause and effect influence the events. With this being said, “the matter of determining which things are causally related is completely empirical” which means that the only restriction is that the events are causally related (Cornman, 150). Additionally, there is no way to explain proximate causation. When attempting to explain how one event causes another, “the cause is remote and not proximate, only if the cause brings about the effect by means of some intervening events” (Cornman, 151). Because of this, proximal causation must be considered due to that fact that there must be acceptance that, regardless of the situation, causes have certain effects (Cornman). 
A third objection considers a scientific principle which argues that interactionism violates the conservation of energy principle (Cornman, 151). This principle states that the amount of energy in a closed physical system remains constant (Cornman, 151). With this being said, if there is a causal interaction between the mental and material, this principle is violated (Cornman, 151).  
Although this objection seems to provide concrete evidence through science against the possibility of interactionism, when thoroughly examined, the conservation principle, in this context, is truly irrelevant. The conservation principle states that in an isolated system the total amount of energy remains constant (Cornman, 152). The interactionist view denies that the human body is an isolated system, so the conservation principle does not apply. Additionally, to further refute this objection, in the physical realm it is possible to have a situation in which a system is conservative, “but is continually acted on by something which affects its movement and the distribution of its total energy” (Cornman, 152). If this is true, the mind could act upon the body in this same way.  
I have argued that dualism, specifically the interactionist theory,  which explains the mind-body problem by suggesting a relationship between the mind and the body, that some mental event is causing a brain event, is a sufficient solution to the problem of mind-body dualism. It provides a consensus that explains the unification of a human mind and human body.  Specifically, it explains and provides evidence that the mind’s mental events and body’s physical events causally influence each other through interaction between mental and material states.
The first considered objection is that there is no evidence as to where the interaction between the mind and the body occurs. However, this objection is not successful because it fails to consider whether causally related events must be located in the same place. It is proven that events do not have to occur in the same place to have an effect on each other.
The second considered objection presents the question of how the interaction between the mental and material occurs. However, it must be considered that both cause and effect influence events. The matter of determining which things are causally related is completely empirical meaning that the only restriction is the events be causally related.
The third objection considers a scientific principle which argues that interactionism infringes on the conservation of energy principle. However, the conservation principle states that in a causally isolated system the total amount of energy will remain constant. The interactionist view denies that the human body is an isolated system, so the conservation principle is irrelevant.
  I have addressed the problem of mind-body dualism, and answered that specifically a form a dualism, interactionism, explains that the mind’s mental events and body’s physical events causally influence each other. I recognize that there are, however, issues that are beyond the scope of this paper that require further argument. For example, the issue of mental properties, states or substances can be radically different from each other. Further research could potentially answer this problem and many others that arise when considering mind and body interactions. 

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